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INTRODUCTION 
Although I have been in Asia a number of times, and was an 
American soldier in the Philippines during World War II, this is my first 
visit to China. I am very pleased and excited at the prospect of seeing 
more of this great country, its people, and especially the students. At 
home I have visited museums many times to admire Chinese art, and I 
have been especially interested in Chinese gardens. In New York there 
is a fairly new and very impressive Chinese "scholars garden"; and in 
Vancouver, Canada, we much enjoyed the "Dr. Sun Yat Sen classical 
Chinese garden." So my wife and I are looking forward to a glimpse of 
modem China and its cultural treasures. 
Of course I am here at Beida not to talk about China, but to bring 
some thoughts about my own country's experience in trying to 
understand the meaning of the rule of law and to make good on its 
promise. I will have to take up some issues in jurisprudence, and also 
some aspects of American legal history. I do not apologize for 
combining jurisprudence and sociology of law, for that combination 
faithfully reflects what we are trying to achieve in the Jurisprudence and 
Social Policy Program (JSP) in the Boalt School of Law at the 
University of California, Berkeley. The JSP baby is growing up, but for 
me it is still lovable, and we are proud of it. 
I was asked to give an "informal" lecture, so I will try to deal with 
my subject in a relaxed way. I invite you to follow me as, painting with 
broad strokes, I pay special attention to the mountains and the valleys, 
leaving more subtle details to another time, and a better artist. 
I begin with some comments on the meaning of the rule of law, 
then go on to consider some important lessons of American history, 
including problems we face today in what is called, in a patriotic song, 
"the land of the free and the home of the brave."1 
• Professor Emeritus of Law and Sociology, University of California, Berkley. This article 
was presented at a meeting of faculties and students of the Law School of Peking 
University, Beijing, China, July 16, 2002. 
1. National Anthem, 36 U.S.C. § 301 (2004) (commonly referred to as the Star 
Spangled Banner). 
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I. Two CONCEPTS OF THE RULE OF LA w 
The first thing we must say is that the phrase "rule of law" refers to 
an ideal, something that we look to as a criterion or standard of good 
conduct, especially but not exclusively official conduct. "Rule of law" 
is a way of saying that the rules and procedures of a legal system must 
meet-or at least strive to meet-tests or standards, which are drawn 
from fairness and justice. Therefore we must say that the rule of law is 
law plus standards. These standards tell us which official acts are truly 
lawful, and which may be criticized as illegitimate, unjustified, or as 
abuse of power. In a system governed by the rule of law no official, 
however mighty, is above the law. Every official is accountable; every 
rule, every decision, must be justified by some grant of authority. 
Whatever is opened to justification invites criticism. We take it for 
granted that, under the rule of law, individuals and groups, with the help 
of lawyers, can raise questions like: by what authority do you hold 
office, or act as you do? How far does your authority extend and how is 
it limited? The result is a system in which official discretion-what 
officials can do using their own judgment-is restrained. For example, 
we have strict rules regarding the use of firearms by the police; or we 
say government agencies must hold hearings before issuing certain 
rules. Limiting discretion is a way of avoiding potentially arbitrary, self-
seeking decisions. This ideal is never fully achieved. We can never have 
a system which is only or completely "a government of laws and not of 
men. "2 This maxim is not meant to be taken literally, as if the passions 
and interests, the choices and strategies of human beings could be 
eliminated from the legal process. Rather, the decisions made by legal 
actors-judges, legislators, police, prosecutors, administrative 
officials-should be governed by certain standards of the official 
propriety. To devise the standards, doing the best we can, we need close 
study of how rules and decisions are made. This study is complicated in 
part because different standards are needed for different kinds of rules 
and decisions. We don't worry too much about small matters, like fines 
for illegal parking. We have much greater concerns, and, therefore, 
demand more protections, when great injustice can be done. For 
example, when a person might be punished severely, perhaps sent to 
prison or even killed. Furthermore, official discretion is not necessarily 
an evil, to be stamped out. It is often defensible and even necessary. We 
don't want so many rules about rules, or such strict standards, that the 
2. John Adams, Novanglus Papers, No. 7, in 4 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 106 
(Charles Francis Adams ed., 1851 ). 
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work of government (or other officials) cannot get done. The rule of law 
is not meant to eliminate discretion. It is not an anarchist strategy for 
making government unnecessary or impossible. Instead, we impose 
restraints that are needed and appropriate, given what we know about, 
for example, what the police might do if they could act as they see fit. 
The standards we apply for the control of police discretion are not the 
same as those we apply to other officials, such as judges, juries, and 
administrators. Therefore, we need close study of different kinds of 
officials, including the work they do, the resources they have, and the 
conditions in which they operate. All this makes a lot of work for 
sociology of law. 
Another complication-another challenge for sociology of law-is 
that there is no single model for the rule of law. Within and among rule-
of-law communities, there is much debate as to whether specific 
practices, rules, and institutions further the ideal, or undermine it. Some 
judges are elected, others are appointed by elected officials. Which way 
is best? Americans have great confidence in juries, but they get less 
confidence in Britain and on the European continent. Indeed, although 
the differences between common-law and civil-law legal systems are 
considerable, there is no lively debate as to which is better from the 
standpoint of the rule of law. For the most part the systems are taken to 
be roughly equal alternatives, each successful and deficient in different 
ways. Nor can we ignore the special claims of history. There may be 
many arguments against the U.S. Supreme Court as part of a democratic 
government, especially when we consider how often momentous 
decisions are made by a bare majority of the Court. But Americans are 
comfortable with the Supreme Court as an institution, and are not likely 
to change it or pay much attention to arguments against it. This 
variation in what can be accepted as meeting rule-of-law standards 
raises many questions. What is essential? What different practices can 
be accepted as different but reasonable ways of making good the 
promise of the rule of law? 
To answer the question, we must distinguish general principles 
from particular rules or procedures. Justice requires impartial and 
independent judge, and the opportunity to be heard in his cause, offering 
relevant proofs and arguments. Just how this is done can vary, reflecting 
different culture and histories. 
One more point about the meaning of the rule of law. I cannot 
leave it out because it is so important. I have in mind the difference 
between a negative, low-risk, understanding of the rule of the law and a 
more affirmative, more demanding, and in sorµe ways a more risky 
point of view. Narrowly conceived, the rule of law is a set of safeguards 
3
Selznick: American Society And The Rule Of Law
Published by SURFACE, 2005
32 Syracuse J. Int'I L. & Com. [Vol. 33:29 
against the abuse of power. Officials are to be chained down by 
constitutional restraints, procedural rules, including rules of evidence, 
and institutional arrangements, such as a hierarchy of courts. This 
narrow or negative conception has great appeal. It concentrates attention 
on the most serious wrongs officials can do; it's a conception well 
supported by historical achievements and widely recognized principles, 
such as the independence of the judiciary. Nevertheless, this is by no 
means a wholly satisfactory point of view. In contemporary discussions 
of the rule of law, we find much that goes beyond the negative virtue of 
restraining official misconduct. The rule of law, it is said, and not only 
very recently, is a regime that protects the weak against the strong; 
provides for peaceful settlement of disputes; facilitates economic 
transactions; and creates an effective framework within which private 
life and enterprise can go forward. This thicker, more positive vision 
speaks to more than the abuse of power. It speaks to values that can be 
realized, not only protected, within a legal process. These values include 
respect for the dignity and moral equality of persons and groups. This 
understood, the rule of law enlarges horizons even as it conveys a 
message of restraint. 
II. THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION AND THE RULE OF LAW 
In the United States, the most visible bulwark of the rule of law is 
the Constitution, which was drafted by a special convention in 1787. 
This framework for effective and limited government is the centerpiece 
of American legal culture. All government officials are sworn to uphold 
the Constitution, which is interpreted and enforced by the Supreme 
Court. The Constitution is "the supreme law of the land"3 and the 
Supreme Court has authority to say what the Constitution means, and to 
do so with finality. In accordance with the institution of "judicial 
review," the Court can declare that a law passed by Congress, or by a 
state legislature, or an administrative decision, is unconstitutional and 
therefore void, that is, without legal effect. 
The Constitution has a number of specific provisions, for example, 
each state has two senators, and the President's term of office is four 
years.4 On the other hand, the Constitution includes many more general 
ideas and concepts, which require thoughtful and creative interpretation. 
Thus, the Constitution gives Congress authority to regulate "commerce" 
among the states (usually referred to as "interstate commerce"), but just 
3. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
4. Id. arts. I,§ 3, cl. 1 and II§ 1, cl. 1. 
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what this means is not spelled out. The Bill of Rights, adopted soon 
after the Republic was founded-they are the first ten amendments to 
the Constitution-speaks grandly of "the freedom of speech," "due 
process of law," "cruel and unusual punishment."5 The Fourteenth 
Amendment, adopted in 1866 after a bloody Civil War, declares that all 
"persons" are entitled to "equal protection of the laws."6 These and 
other general concepts have received varying interpretations and have 
been, to a large extent, the substance of American constitutional history. 
The history shows that American effort to make good the promise 
of the rule of law has been difficult, and sometimes very bloody, 
sometimes very turbulent, as during the great conflicts between capital 
and labor in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, or the civil rights 
movement during the 1960s. Much struggle marked the effort to create 
a legal system that would include and benefit all the people. 
When the Constitution was written and adopted, the problem of 
slavery was not faced, despite the principle, enshrined in the 
Declaration of Independence, that "all men are created equal."7 A very 
large number of Americans, whose skin color was black, were subjected 
to cruel but lawful oppression. Nor was slavery the only problem. In the 
nineteenth century the rights of women to be treated equally were 
ignored and denied; behind an ideological screen of "freedom of 
contract," employers were allowed near absolute power in the 
workplace. 
Most of this law was changed, especially in the twentieth century, 
as the Supreme Court took account of new learning and new conditions, 
especially new expectations for social justice. There was a great 
movement from formal to substantive justice. This change required a 
broadened meaning of legal equality, that is, what it means to be equal 
before the law. The general idea was not new. Even a narrow, more 
limited interpretation of the rule of law accepts and even celebrates the 
principle that all who are governed in a political community are entitled 
to equal protection of the laws. However, the standard, narrowly 
interpreted, requires only consistent application of established rules. 
The rules and categories can be taken as given; without critical scrutiny 
by the courts. Thus the law may consist of general rules, applied with 
impeccable regularity; yet it may be based on attitudes of bigotry and 
prejudice against women, racial groups, immigrants, or ordinary 
workers. This was a flaw in American constitutional history. 
5. Id. amends. I, V, VIII. 
6. Id. amend. XIV,§ 1. 
7. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
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In the decades following the Civil War, the Supreme Court was 
called on to interpret the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. For about fifty years this interpretation was narrow and 
formalistic. In 1883, for example, the justices upheld a law forbidding 
sexual intercourse and marriage between blacks and whites. 8 They said 
the law was constitutional because the statute applied equally to both 
races and to all members of each race.9 Thirteen years later the Court 
decided that "separate but equal" facilities for blacks and whites in 
public transportation and other facilities, including public education, 
met the standard of equal protection. 10 
By the middle of the twentieth century, this conception of equal 
protection was radically revised. Propelled by a deepened concern for 
civil rights, the Supreme Court revisited its understanding of legal 
equality, rejecting as unconstitutional legislation whose premise it was 
that, due to race, sex, or ethnicity, some people are intrinsically more 
worthy than others. The justices sought a new understanding of legal 
equality, one that took account of blocked opportunities and other 
aspects of social justice. They began to see that people are not equal 
before the law if the law itself is oppressive, or fails to take account of 
oppression. 
The most important constitutional decision of this era was made in 
1954, in the famous case of Brown vs. Board of Education. 11 In that 
decision the Supreme Court abandoned the idea that racial segregation 
in public schools and other facilities could offer equal protection of the 
laws. During the same era the Court did much to protect the rights of 
women, minorities, and defendants in criminal cases. In this work the 
Court saw itself as an active force in moving the community toward a 
fuller realization of its basic principles. 
Now let us consider what all this means for American legal culture 
lessons that might well be considered by other countries trying to find 
their own path toward the rule of law. 
First is the lesson that American Constitution binds in some way 
and loosens in others. In effect, the generations of Americans alive 
today have agreed to live by rules and concepts that were conceived and 
adopted by their ancestors. This is part of what it means to accept a 
Constitution. Furthermore, the Constitution binds down those who are 
entrusted with power, and this applies to all officials, including the 
8. Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583, 584 (1883). 
9. Id. at 585. 
10. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
11. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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elected representatives of the people. Therefore in a constitutional 
system democracy is limited-is held in check by the Constitution. 
Although we honor the will of the people, we also ask: how is the will 
of the people to be governed? Constitutional democracy answers this 
question by forging what Thomas Jefferson once called "the chain of 
Constitution."12 
On the other hand, the Constitution loosens because it leaves a 
great deal for future generations to decide. The Constitution is meant to 
be a framework within which self-government may go forward. This 
means each generation can decide for itself what policies to pursue, on 
most issues, so long as they do not violate constitutional rules and 
principles. 
The Constitution loosens in yet another way. Its abstract clauses 
must be read in the light of new circumstances and fresh 
understandings. Some of us say, therefore, that the Constitution is a 
"living" or "evolving" or "responsive" institution. We cannot know 
what is "cruel and unusual punishment" without taking account of 
changing values and ways of thinking about punishment; we cannot 
know what "due process" requires without knowing what a government 
can afford to do, or know how to do, for example in providing legal 
help for defendants who can't afford a lawyer; we can't interpret the 
meaning of "commerce" without taking "judicial notice" of how a 
modern economy is organized. The Supreme Court's decisions on racial 
segregation reflected modern scientific knowledge about the 
superficiality and irrelevance of race differences. 
Another lesson is that the Constitution conveys a dual message of 
skepticism and of optimism. The American legal order holds these two 
attitudes in tension. Skepticism underpins what is most apparent in the 
law-an array of devices to hold men in check. Confidence is more 
subtle, but no less pervasive. It is evident whenever the law hinges on 
trust, cooperation, good-will, and self interest. The themes of skepticism 
and confidence evoke contrasting views of law and justice. One view, 
founded in moral skepticism, takes the law to be a system of restraining 
rules. Law exists because without it there would be chaos or repression, 
or both. Its main work is to keep the peace and limit the abuse of power. 
The alternative is to think of law as a vehicle of human aspiration. On 
this view, legal experience points to a kind of order and a kind of social 
control. Where there is fidelity to law, order is not to be purchased at 
any price. It imposes costs and generates expectations. People think 
12. Thomas Jefferson, Draft Kentucky Resolutions para. 8 (1798). 
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order should be maintained, but without police brutality, and with 
respect for the requirement of ordinary life. The outcome is a vision of 
law as a realm of value, based on fairness, justice, and civic 
participation, not on coercion, or not only coercion. 
Every legal system is a unique blend of skepticism and confidence. 
In the United States there has been an irrepressible tendency to make 
confidence the keynote of the legal order. Although the Constitution 
conveyed a message of restraint, including checks and balances within 
the government, it also encouraged great confidence in self-
govemment-in what democracy could do to create a greater nation by 
mobilizing collective will and collective intelligence. The Constitution 
did not produce an austere or disciplined policy, although some of the 
founders would have liked that outcome. In a setting of open frontiers 
and expanding industry, the work of judging, lawyering, and lawmaking 
was more disorderly, more exuberant, more democratic. The law had to 
catch up with the great changes in industry, commerce, immigration, 
and the growth of cities. This required a spirit . of confidence, including 
openness to new legal ideas about contracts, corporations, and finance. 
We should also remember that, as children of the enlightenment, the 
founding fathers had almost boundless faith that human reason, 
embodied in effective institutions, could reign in self-interest and 
govern disorderly passions. One senses a confidence in institutions 
combined with much skepticism about the frailty and folly of 
individuals. Nor were they wholly skeptical about humankind. Their 
argument was not that everyone is sinful, it is rather that there is 
sufficient risk of sin to justify institutional restraints. Furthermore, 
political or economic power is not necessarily evil. Power can enable as 
well as corrupt. However, we cannot rely on goodwill, still less on 
claims to moral wisdom or perfection. Therefore, in the design of 
institutions we must know what to guard against, and what we can rely 
upon. These are skeptical premises; but they are also foundations on 
which confidence can be built. 
This appreciation of what we might call the yin of skepticism and 
yang of optimism-polarities always in tension but also involve each 
other-has been a source of much controversy in American 
jurisprudence. Conservative juries have focused attention on skepticism 
and a philosophy of restraint. This comes out in the fight over "judicial 
activism." Liberal judges have been more willing to see the Constitution 
as subject to evolution, especially in interpreting general clauses and 
constitutional principles. Conservatives claim they are following the 
text of the Constitution, that they are "interpreting" law, not "making" 
law. They are right to maintain that judicial creativity must be limited 
8
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 33, No. 1 [2005], Art. 4
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol33/iss1/4
2005] American Society and the Rule of Law 37 
by respect for what legislators have said and intended, and by regard for 
precedent, but the reality of judicial creativity cannot be denied. In fact, 
the line between "making" and "interpreting" is not neat and clean, nor 
can it be. There is much hypocrisy here, because conservative judges 
have often been activist, and not much concerned with precedent. They 
would like to read into the Constitution their own views about crime, 
abortion, and the powers of the national government. Nevertheless, 
there has been controversy about the meaning of the Constitution. 
Ill. PRIVATE GOVERNMENT AND THE RULE OF LAW 
Although the United States has done pretty well in restraining 
public government by the rule of law, we have had much less success in 
doing the same for private government. The phrase "private 
government" is sometimes used by students of law and society to refer 
to the management of large, complex organizations, which have become 
a very prominent feature of the social landscape. The leaders of these 
organizations, mostly great business corporations, but also trade unions, 
churches, universities, and other institutions, have great power over the 
lives of employees, the security of investments, the safety of products, 
and much else that goes on in the life of a large enterprise. The leaders 
are governors because they have responsibility for the enterprise as a 
unified whole, a living reality. They make rules by which ordinary 
people must live, and they make decisions that affect the public interest 
and safety, environmental protection, and fairness in the hiring and 
promotion of employees. If the leaders neglect or abuse those interests, 
we can say that the power thus exercised is arbitrary and oppressive. 
These practices cry out for control by the rule of law. This cannot 
happen unless our understanding of the rule of law extends to private as 
well as public government. Taking this step has been a major challenge 
for American jurisprudence. 
We have met this challenge, to a limited extent, by recognizing that 
contracts between employers and trade unions-we call them collective 
bargaining contacts-can create systems of shared governance-a kind 
of constitutional order providing for justice in the workplace based on 
rules agreed upon by both labor and management, and providing for 
agreed-upon ways of handling disputes and grievances. This is a 
weaker, American version of the German institution of Mitbestimmung, 
which can be translated as shared governance. 
These advances have been supported, to some extent, by the 
economic benefits, for a large business, of bureaucratic rationality 
including consistent personnel policy. In recent years, however, the 
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power of trade unions has weakened, and this has strengthened the hand 
of corporate managers. 
This year much more has come out regarding the lawless conduct 
of American business leaders. You have probably heard of the Enron 
Corporation, and of the many other scandals and bankruptcies that have 
pummeled the stock market and shaken public confidence in corporate 
executives, directors, and their hired accountants. It's clear that many 
business leaders have greedily seized opportunities to enrich 
themselves. This unjust enrichment might not matter so much if 
everyone else also benefited, at least to some extent. In fact, however, 
many people without special privileges have lost their jobs as 
enterprises collapsed, or have lost much of what they thought were 
savings to be used for retirement or for the education of their children. 
Much of this lawless is due to major weakness in our system of 
corporate governance, especially how corporate executives and directors 
are held accountable. There has been much evidence of self-dealing, 
collusion, and conflict of interest. The government agencies that should 
monitor and control this malfeasance have been week or timid; the rules 
for improving responsibility have been effectively resisted; and many of 
those who should be more assertive have kept quiet. For example, a 
great deal of corporate stock is held and traded by large mutual funds 
and pension systems, yet the managers of those funds have done little to 
take the initiative and use their influence to see that accounting is honest 
and that corporate earnings are fully accurately reported. 
These failings show us how important it is to base the rule of law 
on openness and accountability; and they also show that rule-of-law 
standards require close scrutiny and detailed understanding of how 
decisions are made, how they may be corrupted, and how they may be 
controlled. 
Here is where lawyers meet specialists in business practice and the 
science of administration. We cannot know how to make organizations 
accountable, we cannot know how to frame rule-of-law standards, 
without knowing what makes a rule workable, or what limits can be 
placed on managerial authority without imposing intolerable burdens on 
rational administration. In the United States, the business leaders and 
their political spokesmen are likely to say that any limitation is too 
much. They used to say, in opposing trade unions, that a unified 
command is essential, that control of the workplace cannot be shared. 
These objections must be met with skepticism, and with genuine 
understanding of what can be done and should be done. Professor Lon 
Fuller, who was one of the greatest twentieth century students of 
jurisprudence, rightly said that lawyers are architects of social 
10
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organization. 13 It is their high calling to design structure and draft rules 
that make sense from a business point of view and, at the same time, 
protect the rights and interests of everyone affected by the decisions of 
management. 
This is a very big subject, and I am sorry I do not have time to go 
into it more fully. So I will close with a brief comment on the vocation 
of lawyering in the public interest. We serve the public good, not as 
preachers or politicians, although we do teach ethics and we do make 
trouble for political leaders. Rather, we serve the public interest by 
helping the community negotiate the distance between ideals of right 
conduct, including ideals of justice, and the legitimate goals and 
practical demands which pull us away from those ideals. The great task 
is to uphold moral principles, especially the right ordering of interests 
and powers, but to do so in a way that allows the society to function and 
flourish. The hard task is bound to give lawyering a shaky reputation, 
because we are always looking for acceptable tradeoffs and workable 
compromises, for ways of taming self-interest without frustrating 
initiative and without suffocating enterprise. 
May the spirit of democracy, love for the people and dedication to 
ideals be with you, today and always. 
13. LON L. FULLER, The Lawyer as Architect of Social Structure, in THE PRINCIPLES OF 
SOCIAL ORDER: SELECTED ESSAYS OF LON L. FULLER 264 (1981 ). 
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